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Abstract
In a recent decision of the Commission of the European Com­
munity (EC), the two main producers of soda-ash in Europe, ICI 
and Solvay, were accused of having engaged in a concerted practice 
from the early 1970s until the time of the Commission’s decision. 
This article argues that the degree of information provided by the 
Commission leaves room to alternatively interpret the firms’ be­
havior as competitive. Indeed, it is shown that the Commission 
did not have all information necessary to determine whether the 
firms collude or compete in the soda-ash market. In applying the 
indistinguishability theorem, I stress the difficulty to draw cor­
rect inferences on firm behavior when some relevant information 
is lacking. I found that the degree of information provided by 
the Commission in its final report is not sufficient to determine 
whether the two firms played a collusive or a competitive game.
*1 would like to thank L. Phlips and R. Harstad for helpful comments on an earlier 






















































































































































































In a recent decision of the Commission of the European Community (EC) 
1, the two main producers of soda-ash in Europe, ICI and Solvay, were 
accused of having engaged in a concerted practice from the early 1970s 
until the time of the Commission’s decision. This alleged infringement of 
Art. 85 of the EEC Treaty was based on an implicit agreement to avoid 
competition in each other’s home markets. The Commission argued that 
the absence of trade between ICI’s home markets (UK and Ireland) and 
Solvay’s home markets (continental Europe) gave proof of the existence of 
tacit collusion which had led to monopoly prices in the above mentioned 
markets.
In this article I argue that the degree of information provided by 
the Commission leaves room to alternatively interpret the firms’ behav­
ior as competitive. Indeed, I will show below that it is not possible to 
distinguish between tacit collusion and competition properly with the 
available information.
2 The M arket for Soda-ash and the Com ­
m ission’s Decision
Soda-ash, an alkaline chemical commodity, is mainly used as a raw ma­
terial in the glass manufacturing industry. To a much lesser extent it 
serves for the production of detergents and in metallurgy. While nat­
ural soda-ash is extracted from mines in the US, Africa, Australia and 
Asia, Europe’s entire output is produced by a synthetic chemical process 
invented by Solvay in 1865.
There are six suppliers of soda-ash in the EC among which Solvay 
is the largest single producer with 60 percent market share in western 
Europe. Solvay has plants in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal. ICI is the second largest producer in the EC and



























































































serves the UK and Ireland (serving about 90 percent of this market) from 
its two plants in the UK 2. On the continent, Solvay faces competition 
from two German, one Dutch and one French producer. It must be 
emphasized that these suppliers mainly serve their respective domestic 
markets. Solvay is thus the only virtually European producer that can 
be regarded as a multinational company. Despite this fact, the company 
never tried to gain access to the British market. Similarly, ICI does 
not sell soda-ash in continental Europe. Other competitors from third 
countries (mainly from the US) play only a minor role in Europe’s soda- 
ash market.
Transportation costs constitute a considerable fraction of a firm’s 
cost function when supplying soda-ash to a customer. Therefore, prices 
for soda-ash significantly increase with the distance from the delivering 
plant to the final customer. Overseas shipping incorporates additional 
costs, not only because of its expensive rates for freight and insurance, but 
also because the commodity has to be stored in the foreign harbor. The 
ability of a firm to serve the commodity continuously on a daily or weekly 
basis is extremely important in the glass manufacturing industry. Since 
most customers have established continuous process plants for which they 
hold stocks of soda-ash for a few days only.
Further, it should be mentioned that the overall demand for soda- 
ash in Europe (and in the world market) went through a phase of stagna­
tion in the early 80’s, but experienced a strong increase in sales towards 
the end of the decade. Since then production has been run at full capac­
ity, due also to it being difficult, if not impossible to get permission for 
the construction of a new plant in the EC 3. In addition, there have been 
longstanding commercial links between ICI and Solvay. After several 
cartel ageements dating back to the last century, the two firms settled 
a new agreement right after the second world war. The essence of this 
so-called “Page 1000” agreement consisted of a market sharing cartel for 
soda-ash. Continental Europe was assigned to Solvay while ICI agreed to 
restrict its activity to the British Commonwealth. After having obtained
2ICI closed one of its original three plants in 1984.




























































































legal advice that the agreement was against Art. 85 of the Treaty of 
Rome, ICI and Solvay formally terminated Page 1000 on Dec. 31th 1972 
in order to prevent an action by the Commission.
The Commission used the fact that neither ICI nor Solvay invaded 
each other’s market after the agreement was cancelled, as proof that 
market separation, and hence collusion, still continued. The only dif­
ference being that ICI and Solvay now engaged in a concerted practice, 
the Commission’s terminology for what is known in economics as tacit 
collusion. The Commission argued that the absence of market penetra­
tion can only be explained by a tacit agreement to maintain the formerly 
explicit cartel agreement. Competition would have provoked mutual en­
try, prices in both markets being monopolistic and thus, leaving positive 
profit opportunities for a foreign entrant.
To justify its reasoning, the Commission pointed to the price gap 
between the two markets which had existed over a long period of time. 
Before 1980, the price for soda-ash used to be lower in the UK than on 
the continent. During the last decade however, UK prices rose by about 
15-20 percent above those of continental Europe. This price movement 
served as an indication that it would have been profitable for the firm in 
the lower price market to enter the higher price market. Furthermore, 
ICI purchased large tonnages of soda-ash from Solvay between 1985 and 
1988 in order to meet its long-term contracts with its British customers. 
Hence, ICI’s obvious difficulty in serving its home market should have 
given an additional incentive for Solvay to enter the UK market directly 
rather than selling soda-ash to a potential competitor. The Commission 
therefore accused Solvay of deliberately not having invaded the lucrative 
British market in the 1980’s.
3 The Theoretical Framework: Collusion  
detection  and Foreign Entry
In economic theory, the soda-ash market constitutes an example of po­




























































































firm entered the other’s home market unambiguously reflects collusive 
behavior or whether mutual staying out may also arise in a competitive 
equilibrium. The latter requires each incumbent to set the price such that 
the potential entrant cannot make profits through entering the foreign 
market. If mutual staying out can be the result of either a competitive 
or a collusive strategy, the Commission cannot infer the underlying firm 
behavior from the observed market structure alone. This case is formally 
developed in the so-called indistinguishability theorem by Harstad and 
Phlips (1993). They show that an informational disadvantage on the be­
half of the governmental authorities concerning the necessary parameters 
to calculate competitive and collusive prices may make it impossible to 
distinguish between competition and collusion.
In order to illustrate the indistinguishability problem in the soda- 
ash market, I set up a linear demand model with a*, being the intercept of 
the demand curve with the vertical price axis. For simplicity, we assume 
the slope of the demand curve to be —1. Firms are supposed to play 
price strategies, an assumption that is based upon some characteristics 
of the soda-ash market. Usually, suppliers set up list prices and rebate 
schemes for one year in advance. Having long-term contracts with their 
customers, producers guarantee that prices remain fixed for the duration 
of the contract of delivery. Consequently, producers adjust quantities 
according to demand throughout the year. Since the production process 
is rather simple (soda-ash is obtained through a fall-out process of some 
basic chemicals), it is fairly easy to increase or to decrease production in 
the short term.
Under these conditions it is straightforward that the joint profit 
maximizing price per period is
m ak + °u 
Pik =  — o---- i = 1,2 (1)
in home market k where firm i is low cost. Since collusion protects firms 
from foreign entry whenever the discount factor 6 is close enough to 1 
in an infinitely repeated game, collusion yields a market structure of k 




























































































Under the competitive equilibrium, prices for the duopoly in market 
k have to be at marginal cost. Theoretically, there exist two equilibrium 
prices because marginal costs differ across firms in each market, so that 
either a price of p?k =  cu or p̂ k — cn, may prevail 4. But as soon as 
Pil < cih, the foreign firm will have to exit market k. Therefore, the 
domestic low cost firm, firm i, will set p̂ k «  Cjk. where j  indicates the 
foreign (high cost) firm This involves slightly undercutting the foreign 
firm’s marginal cost in order to prevent the rival from gaining any market 
share and hence capturing the entire market k in each time period of the 
game. Put differently, at a price of pfk < Cjk, there would be no profit 
opportunity and hence no incentive for the foreign firm to enter market 
k. Therefore, the competitive equilibrium requires incumbent i to set a 
price of
Pile = cih (2)
in market k. Pricing at the rival’s marginal cost level constitutes a limit 
pricing strategy to deter entry. This strategy forms a subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium and reflects competitive behavior.
Transferring this result to our indistinguishability problem, we can 
state the following.
1) A monopoly price as in equation (1) indicates unacceptable behav­
ior from the point of view of the authorities.
2) A Nash limit price as in equation (2) indicates acceptable behavior.
These inferences can only be drawn if the authorities know the true 
values cxk,cn and Cjh-
If the authorities have no or no correct information on at least one 
of the true values o^, c; orej  5, the indistinguishability theorem can be 
illustrated by the following example. Suppose the authorities know that 
price strategies are played and that price formation is as in (1) or (2).
4Due to the law of one price there has to be a unique Nash price for both firms in 
market k.
5We drop the indices i and j  for this illustration, assuming thereby that cost 




























































































Let ak, Q and Ch denote estimates of the true values of the parameters 
and consider the following relationships. If
dk -  2ch -  ci (3)
or
ci = 2ch -  ak (4)
then acceptable behavior is not distinguishable from unacceptable be­
havior since pif — when either (3) or (4) is substituted into (1).
Similarly, if
, ak + ci
C h~ ~ ~ T ~
it is straightforward to see that acceptable behavior appears the same as 
unacceptable behavior. In other words, the authorities observe a price 
behavior which does not allow them to distinguish whether firms are 
engaged in a competitive or collusive game.
4 Some Num erical Exam ples
The purpose of this section is to highlight the theoretical results with 
some numerical examples based on the information we possess on the 
soda-ash case. We consider the Commission’s task of determining whether 
ICI and Solvay engaged in an action prohibited by Art. 85 of the EEC 
Treaty. We assume that the Commission has all the information outlined 
in section 2 (empirical knowledge) and in section 3 (theoretical knowl­
edge). The special characteristics of both the product and the market 
require the following assumptions:
First, let firm 1 be ICI with home market a representing the UK and 
Ireland. Solvay is labelled firm 2, with home market b corresponding to 
continental Europe. ICI’s home market is definitely smaller than Solvay’s 
home market. This is due to the fact that the glass industry, which 
represents the prime demand for soda-ash, is an important industrial 
sector in all major EC member countries while Ireland has only a few 




























































































intercept, a*, required to calculate monopoly prices in each market. For 
ICI’s home market, we can take the intercept a*, to represent its entire 
home market. The reason is that we consider ICI as being a monopolist 
in Ireland and in the UK, serving both countries from its two British 
plants.
Matters are quite different for Solvay. We know that Solvay is 
confronted with several other EC competitors of respectable size. We 
know further that Solvay usually satisfies demand within national bor­
ders. Hence, French customers are supplied through French plants, Ger­
man customers through German plants and so on. This phenomenon is 
related to transportation costs, as we will see later. Apart from this, the 
fact that delivery is within national borders provides important infor­
mation about how to choose the intercept for the determination of the 
collusive outcome.
To illustrate this point, let us take a closer look at price formation 
in continental Europe. It is straightforward to see that Solvay would 
maximize global profits over all national submarkets in market b if it were 
a monopolist. However, there are other suppliers in some countries 6 7. 
The product being homogeneous, firms have to agree to set a single price 
(including transportation cost) in each of the national (sub-) markets. In 
other words, p ^  will differ in each national submarket according to the 
number of competitors in that market. Hence, the intercept relevant to 
Solvay’s entire home market, will be defined as aj =  Brn/n. where
Bm is the market size in submarket rn and n is the number of submarkets 
on the continent1.
Second, analogous to our definition of the relevant intercept for 
the computation of p^f we have to split up the cost function. While
6Notably in France, Germany and the Netherlands.
7We are aware of the fact that this will lead to only an approximation of collusive 
prices. However, we have to take into account that the Commission argues with 
a continental price as against a ‘British’ price for soda-ash. In order to illustrate 
the theory behind the observed price behavior and to respond to the Commission 
decision, we have to stylize our representation of the soda-ash industry. Nevertheless, 
our approximation does not prevent us from drawing reasonable inferences concerning 




























































































production technology seems to be relatively mature and standardized, 
care has to be exercised with respect to the transportation cost as a 
component of variable costs. In order to take into account the additional 
costs incurred when soda-ash is shipped overseas, we specify total costs 
for firm i as follows:
Cih = cu + tik k — a.b i —1,2 (6)
where c;/ includes the production as well as transportation costs of serv­
ing customers in the home market. Although the cost of transporta­
tion clearly increases with distance to the customer, we can think of cu 
as a production cost plus an average cost parameter. Again, we have 
to approximate c,-/ by averaging over each submarket. As before, this 
procedure is necessary for the computation of both Nash and collusive 
prices since Cu influences limit prices in both markets, a and b. Aver­
age transportation costs may vary between countries depending on the 
distance between the location of plants and the location of customers in 
the national markets. The second term in (6), tik, stands for the costs of 
shipping overseas and delivering soda-ash to the foreign market. This is 
zero if sales occur only in the home market. Consequently, each firm is 
low cost cu in its home market but high cost in the foreign market.
The purpose of averaging costs and intercepts is to get a reasonable 
proxy for the price levels of soda-ash in markets a and b. One argument 
the Commission used as proof of a concerted practice was that prices 
on the continent were higher than in the UK in the 1970s while the 
reverse was true throughout the 1980s. But prices also vary between 
other European countries, making it difficult to determine whether prices 
in market a tended to be higher or lower on average than in market b. 
Although market a is relatively homogeneous on both the demand and 
the supply side 8, market b is characterized by differences in the number 
of customers, the extent of locational distance between suppliers and 
customers and in the number of competitors in each country. Therefore, 
we cannot avoid at least some averaging.
8Even transportation costs within market a are not likely to vary too much as 




























































































With these preliminaries in mind, we can proceed to some numerical 
examples reflecting price behavior in the soda-ash industry. First we will 
model prices consistent with the soda-ash market in the 1970s when prices 
in market a were lower than in market b.
List prices for soda-ash varied from $200 — $240 per metric ton 
(MT) in the EC at the end of the 80s. However, these list prices are not 
equivalent to those prices effectively paid by the customers. First, a 5 
per cent rebate on list prices seems to be common in the industry. Sec­
ond, all suppliers try to bind customers through bulk discount schemes 
9. If we take into account all rebates and discounts, we arrive at effective 
prices which lie around 10 — 15 per cent below list prices. We therefore 
assume prices to be equal to pa = 180 and pb — 200 in our example 9 10. 
Since both firms produce soda-ash with the same production technology, 
we suppose that the cost of production to is the same for each firm, 
yielding an F.O.B. price of $95 per MT. Home market delivery costs, an 
important fraction of the firms’ cost, account for some 25 per cent of 
production costs on average. We specify these cost as $25 per MT. ICI 
serves its home market, the UK and Ireland, from its two plants located 
in the UK. Although Solvay has a much larger home market in terms of 
geographical area, it also owns more plants than ICI. With six produc­
tion facilities in six different EC countries, Solvay serves customers over 
similar distance to ICI. This is reflected by the fact that delivery on the 
continent is carried out mainly within national borders. Thus, we assume 
that average transportation costs within the home market is the same for 
both ICI and Solvay. Adding production and local transportation costs 
together, we get cu — c-u — ci — 120.
The cost supplement tik, incurred when serving the foreign market, 
can be split up into overseas shipping and on-land delivering compo­
nents. The costs of shipping the product overseas is comprised of freight 
and insurance to the foreign harbor as well as warehouse and handling
9E.g. through price reductions per MT if more than a certain quantity per annum 
is ordered.





























































































costs. Overseas shipping and warehouse costs are assumed to account 
for roughly 15 percent of FOB prices or $15 per MT. On-land delivery 
costs in the foreign market are the costs of transportation from the ware­
house to the foreign market customer. Average transportation costs on 
the continent are relatively high for ICI because customers are widely 
spread throughout Europe. Hence, we add an average of $25 per MT to 
ICI’s cost function when serving continental Europe, assuming that ICI 
faces the same on-land transportation costs as Solvay in market b. On 
the other hand, Solvay’s delivery within the UK is less costly since most 
potential customers are located close the southern shore. For the pur­
pose of our example, we take these costs to be $15 per MT. From these 
figures we can compute total transportation costs for the foreign market. 
Serving continental Europe from its British plants would cost t\a =  40 
for ICI, whereas Solvay would have transportation costs of t2b =  30 when 
delivering soda-ash to the UK 11.
Plugging our numerical values into (6) yields Nash prices of
P,a = cbh =  c, + t2b =  120 +  30 = 150 (7)
Pb = cah = ci + tu — 120 + 40 =  160. (8)
Derivation of the limit prices requires calculating Nash prices in the home 
market from the rival’s cost function provided the rival firm sells soda-ash 
in the foreign market. Theoretically, it suffices that cbb < cab for prices to 
be lower in market a than in market b. If the overseas cost supplement, 
tik, was the same for ICI and Solvay, then differences in Nash prices would 
necessarily stem from differences in domestic transportation costs.
Price formation under monopoly can be calculated from equation 
(1). Equations (7) and (8) indicate that our effective prices of $180 and 
$200 respectively cannot be the result of a competitive game. Hence, 
these prices must be the result of collusive behavior. This information 
allows us to draw inferences about a* in equation (1). We obtain
M aa + Ci 
Pa = ~ 2— 2f.° 120 — 18Q2 (9)
11Note that t tb is the transportation cost of firm i  with home market k delivering 




























































































(10)M ab + C1Pb = ---o---
or aa — 240 and a/, =  280. In this example, differences in collusive 
prices across markets are due to differences in the intercepts. Generally 
speaking, it has to be verified that
for pff < Pi* to hold. In other words, price differences under collusive 
behavior have to result from differences in intercepts, differences in home 
market costs or from a combination of both. Differences in foreign market 
transportation costs leave monopoly prices unaffected.
This example demonstrates that pa < pb may hold under collu­
sive or competitive strategies. In addition, both strategies require firms 
to stay out of their rival’s home market. This is the condition under 
which the indistinguishability theorem is valid. The Commission has ob­
served price behavior that could be either acceptable or unacceptable. 
For concreteness, assume that the Commission observed prices pa =  150 
and pb = 160. The price gap between markets a and 6, together with 
the observation that neither firm entered its rival’s market, was the core 
evidence of the existence of tacit collusion. In our example however, 
exactly the same behavior is the result of the competitive game. Our 
conclusion is that the information at hand is not sufficient to solve the 
indistinguishability problem.
Solving this problem requires acurrate and clearcut information 
about the underlying parameters that determine pk- Since the market 
reveals list prices only, the Commission would have to rely on the firms’ 
data and on its own estimations. Needless to say, firms have an interest in 
making the Commission believe they are playing the competitive game. 
As was already mentioned, they may manipulate this data to make col­
lusion appear as acceptable behavior. Using the procedure in section 3, 
we can find estimators for each parameter faking competitive behavior 
and vice versa. If
cra +  C \i <  ab +  C21 ( 11)
- aa +  cn - a,b + C21




























































































i.e. an overestimation of transportation costs to the foreign market, then 
collusive behavior seems to be competitive. Plugging in our chosen pa­
rameter values, we get fla =  80 and t2b =  60. In other words, foreign 
market delivery costs have to be overestimated by 100 per cent in order 
to make collusion look like competition. Similarly, an underestimation 
of intercepts such that
da — 2(c2/ +  t2b) — cu and ab — 2(cu + tla) -  c2i (13)
gives aa = 180 and ab — 200. Thus, underestimating the intercept by 25 
per cent and 29 per cent respectively will make behavior appear collusive 
even though firms are playing the competitive game.
Estimates of c,-/ are more complex to analyze. While ab influences 
only collusive prices and overseas shipping costs influence only compet­
itive prices, costs of production and supply to the home market effects 
price formation for both strategies. An underestimation of q  such that
cu = 2(c2/ +  t2b) -  ota and c2i =  2(cu -f t ia) -  ab (14)
makes competitive behavior look like collusion. Since c\i =  60 and c2i — 
40 given (14), the extent of underestimation has to be 50 per cent and 
66.6 per cent respectively. An overestimation such that
Cll
ab +  C2l
2 Ha and
aa + cu
C21 — -----x---------hb (15)
on the contrary will lead to cu = 160 and c2i — 150. In this case, 
overestimating the true values of cu by one forth and one third causes 
collusion to be mistaken for competition when (15) is substituted into 
(6).
One might argue that the deviations from the true values in our 
example are so large that it seems unlikely the Commission would make 
such bad estimates. We have to take into account, however, that the 
estimation of each parameter involves considerable uncertainty. Take tik 
for example. Since transportation costs to the foreign market allow for 
economies of scale, doubles or even triples when small quantities are 




























































































the market share the foreign firm could capture from the incumbent. 
Since both firms did not enter their foreign market, there is no available 
data on the entrant’s (potential) market share. Thus, we could argue 
that the estimation of f,-* is subject to the highest degree of uncertainty 
among all parameters. This justifies why an overestimation of 100 per 
cent may be quite plausible. In fact, q> and cu show much less variation 
than tik- Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the Commission possesses 
reliable figures on any of these. The intercept depends on gross demand 
in each market and was inferred from effective market prices in our ex­
ample. But as has been already pointed out, list prices do not coincide 
with market prices. Consequently, there is some uncertainty about the 
intercept as well. As for c,-/, uncertainty arises from two sources. First, 
although production technology is the same for ICI and Solvay, the cost 
of production may still vary because of differences in the cost of inputs 
(energy, labor etc). Second, average delivery costs in the home market 
may be different for each firm. In addition, information on c,-/ is firm 
specific and hence any available data has to be viewed with some cau­
tion. These two sources of uncertainty may lead to Cu being either over- 
or underestimated considerably.
5 Solving the Indistinguishability Problem  
under Im perfect Inform ation
Could the Commission have inferred the firms’ actual behavior even 
though it did not have perfect information on all the parameters needed 
to calculate pjf and ? The answer is yes - provided certain informa­
tional requirements are satisfied. Detection of collusion is possible in the 
following circumstances:
a) When it is known that cu = c2i and that aa — at, then p ^  — pf,1 
whatever the actual value of cu and a*. Then, any observed price 





























































































b) When ci; =  c2/ and t\a — t2b and thus = p*. Consequently, price 
differences between markets k =  a, b must be caused by aa ^  at 
and are hence due to collusion.
c) When overseas transportation costs vary significantly between firms 
and markets. Nash prices then differ proportionally, as long as cu 
is about the same for each firm i. Similarly, differences in a* are 
reflected in monopoly prices in each market. Again, it is important 
to know whether Cu differs for i =  1,2. If so, cost differences may 
dampen the effect of the gap in intercepts. In other words, one 
can detect the nature of the game that is played from the gap in 
parameters in each market. If the Commission knows that Cu is 
almost equal for each firm i , significant price differences between 
market a and b can only be caused by differences in a* or in t^ . 
And, if the Commission knows further that the gap in one of these 
two parameters is small while the other one is large, it can draw 
inferences about the firms’ behavior.
Our numerical example in the previous section reflected conditions 
in the market for soda-ash in the 1970s when prices in market a were 
below prices in market b. According to the Commission, a crucial piece 
of evidence that a collusive price game is being played between ICI and 
Solvay is the reversal of this price gap in the 1980s. Given that prices 
in the UK were 15-20 per cent higher than on the continent during this 
decade, the Commission argues that Solvay should have had a strong 
incentive to enter the lucrative British market. The Commission claims 
that the only way to explain Solvay’s absence in the British market is the 
existence of a tacit collusive agreement between the firms which allows 
ICI to raise its home market prices without provoking Solvay’s entry. Our 
analysis provides several arguments to demonstrate the invalidity of the 
Commission’s reasoning. The basic point is that any reversal in the price 
gap must have been due to a change in one or more of the parameters that 
influence price formation - regardless of whether firms play the collusive 
or the competitive game. In addition, the fact that UK prices tended to 




























































































have been the result of an increase in the price level in market a or from 
a decrease in the price level in market b or a combination of both.
The Commission’s report gives no information on whether the re­
versal in the price gap comes from a rise in British prices or from a drop 
in continental prices. Since we already know that a* and c,-; determine 
the collusive price, any price change under collusive behavior has to stem 
from a change in at least one of these two parameters. For to have 
risen, aa must have increased or Cu must have decreased (or a combi­
nation of the two) until the sign of (11) is reversed. Alternatively, a 
decrease in ab, an increase in c2/ or a combination thereof would have 
had the same effect. Under limit pricing on the other hand, an increase 
in c2; and/or an increase in t2b causes to rise. Equivalently, a drop 
in pb , leading to > pb , also satisfies our condition. A decrease in C\i 
and/or a decrease in t\a make this alternative work.
Without knowing which of the above parameters actually changed 
and in which direction, no inference can be drawn about firm behavior. 
The fact that prices in one or both markets changed, as such, is not of 
any further help in solving the indistinguishability problem.
The Commission’s report provides information on some particular 
characteristics of the soda-ash market in the 1980’s. First, it is mentioned 
that the market stagnated at the beginning of the decade, but that sales 
soared at the end of the 1980’s. Second, ICI closed one of its three plants 
in the UK in 1984, perhaps as a reaction to the sluggish demand in the 
British soda-ash market. Third, ICI bought large tonnages of soda-ash 
from Solvay in the mid- eighties to satisfy its domestic customers.
Several scenarios can be drawn on the basis of this information. 
Stagnation and sluggish demand potentially reduce the height of the 
intercept. If this phenomenon were the influence on the market, price 
changes would occur under collusion only. Limit prices would not be 
affectes since they do not depend on the value of the intercept. It can 
then be verified that Aa„ < A a i . e .  that the decrease in demand was 
higher in market b than in market a. This is the only way in which 
collusive prices could undergo a reversal such that p^f > pfi1, all other 




























































































does not say anything about the development of Uk during the period of 
observation. We argued before that transportation costs are potentially 
higher for ICI when shipping soda-ash overseas. If we knew that a certain 
development in transportation costs alone was responsible for the reversal 
of the price gap, we would know unambiguously that firms must have 
played the competitive game.
An increase in cu relative to c2/ would be an alternative explana­
tion of why the price gap reversed in the last decade. Recall that both 
Nash prices and monopoly prices rise with increasing cu. ICI reacted to 
the stagnation of the market by closing one production facility and by 
increasing the capacity level of the other two plants. In addition, ICI had 
to buy soda-ash from Solvay to meet its home market contracts in the 
mid-eighties. This could be a hint of temporary efficiency and capacity 
problems for ICI. Thus, Cu might have increased relative to c2; during 
this period. Indeed, we find that average prices were again lower in the 
UK than on the continent by the end of the decade. The fact that pa > pb 
during the 80s could thus have been due to temporary adjustments in 
capacity during this period.
All these arguments point to our inability to solve the indistin- 
guishability problem from the observed reversal of the price gap during 
the last decade. The fact that ICI bought soda-ash from Solvay to supply 
the British market is not of great help in this context. At first glance it 
seems that if Solvay can make profits selling soda-ash to ICI, it could have 
made even higher profits in selling directly to British customers. Here, 
another characteristic of the soda-ash market comes into play. Long­
term contracts and the sensibility of customers for assured delivery make 
it unattractive to switch to other suppliers for a limited period of time 
only. From the viewpoint of producers this means that stepping into a 
foreign market in which they are not yet represented (and hence in which 
they have no reputation for punctual and assured supply) is extremely 
difficult. It is therfore questionable whether Solvay would have been able 
to sell soda-ash to ICI’s customers on any larger scale. ICI’s business 
relations with its customers served as a vehicle by which Solvay could 




























































































Furthermore, it seems that ICI’s difficulty in meeting its contracts 
in its home market occurred during a limited time period only (from 1985 
to 1988). Under these circumstances it may have been more profitable 
for Solvay to sell to ICI the quantity demanded instead of setting up 
its own transportation and delivery network. The latter would involve 
a risk that British customers would choose to purchase from the two 
competitors from Poland and the US when requiring additional supply, 
these two companies already being established in the British market 12.
A short remark on economies of scale in transportation costs should 
be made. The special long-term relationship between customers and 
suppliers is likely to leave a new entrant with only a small market share. 
Hence, a newcomer cannot benefit from economies of scale when shipping 
soda-ash overseas. It is quite reasonable therefore to assume that new 
entrants have significantly higher costs than incumbents in the soda-ash 
market.
There is another aspect worth stressing. One wonders why the 
Commission focussed exclusively on ICI and Solvay in its decision. Mar­
ket separation and home market bias does not only exist between the 
British Isles and the continent, but also between the continental EC 
countries themselves. In order to assess the problem of foreign entry, it 
would be interesting to understand why for example a French producer 
of soda-ash does not sell in Italy. If the Commission states that ICI 
could make profits by entering the continental market, the same should 
be true for a continental supplier extending its current market to another 
country. Similarly, if Solvay is supposed to be able to enter the UK on 
a profitable basis, it is difficult to argue that other European producers 
can not do the same. One has to bear in mind that one basis for the 
Commission decision was the written agreement, “Page 1000”, which ex­
isted between ICI and Solvay and which, according to Brussels, continued 
after its official termination. Nevertheless, the ICI-Solvay cartel in the 
1950’s and 1960’s did not itself prevent other European producers from
12With reference to the theory of contestable markets as developed by Baumol 
W.J., Panzar J.C. and Willig R.D. (1982) we could say that “hit-and-run” strategies 




























































































entering the British market. But obviously, these firms did not choose 
to make use of the entering strategy either. One reason might be that, 
being bound by long-term contracts in their home markets, the smaller 
European producers did not possess enough capacity to serve an addi­
tional market. If this was not the case, their staying-out strategy must 
have been caused by limit prices in the British market or by a collusive 
agreement with ICI, either via a tacit agreement or via some explicit 
agreement of which the Commission is not aware.
The intra-continental behavior of firms may indeed turn out to be 
useful in solving the indistinguishability problem. So far, we have as­
sumed that the other European producers of soda- ash behave in the 
same way as Solvay with respect to ICI. Either they collude in Conti­
nental Europe or they set limit prices to prevent ICI’s entry. Since the 
profit functions of these producers differ from that of Solvay, we cannot 
a priori take their strategies to be equivalent to Solvay’s. That is, these 
firms may have additional incentives to defect from a collusive price 13. In 
a price game with homogeneous products, prices drop to marginal costs 
after the defector captured the entire market during the defecting period. 
This mechanism would lead to a Bertrand-Nash price of pf =  cu in all 
post-deviation periods. Each firm i operating on the continent would 
then make zero profits, provided that marginal cost, cu, are standardized 
throughout the industry. We do not know whether there has ever been 
such a price war on the continent.
But suppose for the moment that a price war has occurred at some 
point in the past. This implies that at least one of the continental soda- 
ash producers preferred to make a one shot gain rather than to collude 
with his competitors over an infinite time horizon. It is reasonable to 
assume ptf > p f , i.e. that the limit price required to prevent ICI’s entry 
into market b lies above the Bertrand-Nash price. If so, collusion through 
a mutual staying- out strategy would not be a sustainable solution in 
the soda-ash market. First, as we have seen, once we depart from the 
collusive price, pricing will be at marginal cost and not at the limit
13 Remember that firms make positive profits under both the collusive and the limit 




























































































price level. Second, since Solvay does not have to fear ICI’s entry when 
continental prices lie below the limit price, ICI cannot sustain monopoly 
prices in its own home market a. Indeed, as long as the price in market 
a is such that pa > Va — c2/ +  hb, it will always be profitable for Solvay 
to enter the British market.
In other words, if Solvay cannot enforce the collusive equilibrium in 
its home market, this prevents the collusive game from being played in 
the foreign market as well. Thus, if it were observed that firms located in 
b compete in their home markets, then our indistinguishability problem 
could be solved. The best ICI can do under these circumstances is to set 
a limit price in market a in order to keep continental competitors out. 
The fact that neither ICI nor Solvay entered each other’s home market 
would then be the result of a competitive game.
6 Indistinguishability and Price D iscrim i­
nation
Until now we implicitly assumed that firms set a common net mill price 
for each customer and that each buyer pays in addtition 100 per cent 
of the transportation costs up to his location. It has been argued by 
Greenhut and Greenhut (1975) that firms can increase profits through 
discriminating between customers when transportation cost play a sig­
nificant role in the final delivery price. The definition of spatial price 
discrimination requires firms to set net mill prices that vary according 
to the customer’s location. With considerable transportation costs, firms 
will maximize profits by freight absorption, i.e. by charging the more dis­
tant customers less than the full cost of transportation. Compared with 
the previous strategy where each customer paid a uniform mill price and 
full delivering cost, this strategy enlarges the sales territory of a firm. 
By absorbing some transportation costs, a firm can serve those very dis­
tant customers whose reservation price lies above the mill price plus 100 
per cent delivery cost. Furthermore, the supplier charges the closer cus­




























































































customers to the closer customers. The counterpart of freight absorp­
tion is then a phantom freight by which closer customers subsidize the 
delivery of the more distant customers.
Figure 1
Firm 1 Firm 2
In this section we postulate a price discrimination strategy and ex­
amine whether the indistinguishability problem continues to exist when 
firms discriminate between customers. As Greenhut and Greenhut demon­
strated, spatial price discrimination may well occur when two or more 
firms are located at two different production centers potentially serving 
the same geographical area 14. Figure 1 illustrates this configuration, ICI
14Greenhut and Greenhut investigate price discrimination when firms are quantity 
setters. However, price discriminating behavior does not depend on assuming Cournot 




























































































being located at x = 0 in market a and Solvay being located at x = 1 in 
market 6.
Customers are assumed to be distributed on a horizontal line of 
unit length. As before, we take demand to be linear with slope 6 = 1 .  
Transportation costs increase proportionally with distance to the produc­
tion center. Thus, firm 1 faces transportation costs of tx and firm 2 faces 
transportation costs of t(\ — x) as i  ranges from 0 to 1. Point F indi­
cates the frontier between the two markets. Cj and C2 represent marginal 
costs of production which is supposed to be constant and the same for 
each firm. For the purpose of this analysis, we assume C\ — c2 =  0. 
Transportation costs rise along the line C\B\ 15. The straight line p\B\ 
gives the prices at which firm 1 maximizes its profits under monopoly by 
charging p™ =  [a + tx)/2. Note that there is a different price for each lo­
cation but that prices increase by less than the increase in transportation 
costs. This is reflected in C\B\ being steeper than p\Bi.
If firm 1 were the only supplier for markets a and 6, it would deliver 
to customers located up to B\. Thus, it would cover the entire market a 
and the part of market 6 that is closest to its production location. But 
the fact that a second firm located in market 6 sells the same products 
reduces the sales territory for firm 1 to point 1 — x*. Between x * and 
1 — x* both producers offer the commodity. At x*, p™ — t( 1 — x*), i.e. 
firm l ’s monopoly price is equal to the marginal cost of firm 2. At any 
location x* < x < 1 , p™ > i(l —x). In the absence of tacit collusion, pf* 
is not sustainable to the right of x*, since firm 2 is able to undercut firm 
l ’s monopoly price. The same argument is valid for p™ at locations to 
the left of 1 — x*. Equilibrium prices in the area from x* to 1 — x* follow 
Bertrand-Nash strategies. Prices are set equal to the marginal cost of the 
firm with the higher transportation cost at each point x* < x < 1 — x*. 
This corresponds to the V-shaped line dfe in Figure 1.
Therefore, the competitive solution includes both an area of natural 
monopoly 16 situated at locations close to one of the production centers as
15Since the graph is symmetric for both firms, we discuss the situation from firm 
l ’s viewpoint only.




























































































well as an area where prices are set at marginal cost situated at locations 
that are distant from the sellers’ locations (and hence, close to the frontier 
F). Prices thus tend to decrease in the area where both competitors 
can sell. Now, if the incumbent, say firm 1 in market a, marginally 
undercuts c2 along df, it would not be profitable for firm 2 to enter 
market a’s territory from x* to F . Similar reasoning holds for firm 2 
in market b. Again, if we allow for limit pricing strategies, incumbents 
will undercut the cost of the potential entrantsin order to capture the 
entire home market up to F. Nevertheless, we observe competition in 
that prices around the frontier fall to the level of the potential entrant’s 
marginal cost. Tacit collusion on the other hand allows each firm to set its 
monopoly price in its entire home market. Therefore, if we observe prices 
that increase continuously with distance from the production center up 
to the frontier F, we know that firms are playing the collusive game.
Consequently, our indistinguishability problem does not exist in 
this basic model. In order to consider our empirical case however, it is 
important to adjust the previous model to the specific cost situation in 
the soda-ash market. We know that whenever a firm wants to enter the 
foreign market, it has to pay a transport cost supplement for overseas 
delivery.


































































































Figure 2 illustrates this case. Line c\B\ is not continuous but has a 
break at point F 17. The vertical difference to between these two segments 
measures the size of the supplement. While the collusive solution does 
not change from that of the previous Figure, the competitive solution 
is characterized by an area of Bertrand-Nash prices that is smaller than 
before. That is, the area x* < x < 1 — x* has shrunk. The overseas 
cost supplement allows firms to extend monopoly pricing to the more 
distant locations in their home markets, even though firms are playing 
the competitive game.
If we knew that the configuration in Figure 2 were the true one, we 
would not need to worry about indistinguishability. But we do not know 
whether the price and marginal cost lines do intersect at points d and e, 
which would suggest that competition requires that prices fall between
17This implies that the price line is also discontinuous.
Market a Market b




























































































x* and 1 — x*. Figure 3 illustrates a scenario in which we can no longer 





Indistinguishability arises here because the transportation cost sup­
plement, to, is higher than in Figure 2. This means that the price and 
cost lines intersect exactly at F, the frontier between markets a and b. It 
follows that staying-out is a competitive strategy in this Figure because 
none of the two firms can make a profit in their foreign market. In gen­
eral, competitive behavior will be compatible with staying-out whenever 
price and cost lines either cross at point F or do not cross at all. In the 
latter case, prices at the frontier are above marginal costs, allowing each 
firm to make a positive profit at the frontier of its home market. Entering 
the foreign market, however, would lead to a loss, since marginal costs 




























































































leaves us with a natural monopoly in each market. This final result gives 
us a situation in which there is a separation of markets, with monopoly 
prices being charged in each of them, regardless of whether firms play 
the collusive or the competitive game.
Hence, we have demonstrated the existence of indistinguishability 
in a model with price discrimination. Although the theoretical frame­
work differs from that of the previous model, whether we can solve the 
indistinguishability problem or not again depends on the availability of 
information on the same parameters. It is straightforward to see from 
our Figures that the location and the shape of the marginal cost line de­
termines the point of intersection between price and cost lines. Changes 
in to, in Ci and/or c2, the marginal cost of production, or in the slope 
of the cost line (e.g. due to economies of scale in transportation costs) 
will therefore alter the point of intersection with the price line. As in 
the limit pricing model, it is essential to have correct information about 
production and transportation cost. Without this knowledge, we cannot 
draw inferences on the behavior of price discriminating firms.
The model presented here is a stylized approximation of the soda- 
ash market in Europe when ICI and Solvay discriminate between cus­
tomers. To keep matters as simple as possible, we illustrated our hy­
pothesis in an entirely symmetric framework. Nevertheless, our basic 
argument, i.e. the presence of indistinguishability under imperfect infor­
mation, does not depend on the symmetry of the model.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this article we have emphasized the difficulty of interpreting economic 
behavior out of an observed market situation. We pointed out that one 
has to be careful whenever one does not know all underlying economic 
parameters that influence the prices observed in the market. Our inves­
tigation of the allegation against ICI and Solvay served as an empirical 
example to highlight our general hypothesis. We did not say that the 




























































































that the Commission did not have all information at hand necessary to 
exclude an alternative interpretation of ICI’s and Solvay’s behavior. We 
examined under which conditions we can draw correct inferences on firms’ 
behavior when some information is lacking. At any rate we found that 
the degree of information provided by the Commission in its final report 
is not sufficient to determine whether the two firms played a collusive or 
a competitive game. In dubio pro reo.
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